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Introduction 
Today’s complex, chaotic, and interconnected world has forced us to rethink 
some of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of leadership, 
especially when it comes to leading whole-of-government or even whole-of-
nation efforts. This is especially the case in the U.S. national security 
enterprise (hereafter referred to as the NSE or enterprise) where a complex, 
diverse constellation of military and civilian agencies must wield both hard 
and soft power on behalf of the United States. For various reasons, that 
enterprise has become our nation’s “first responder” when it comes to almost 
any challenge, from traditional military operations to a myriad of nonmilitary 
ones, to include disaster and pandemic relief and humanitarian assistance 
(the Ebola crisis comes to mind), post–conflict reconstruction, and even 
nation-building. Irrespective of the challenge, our nation’s political leaders 
look to senior officers—particularly but not exclusively those in uniform—who 
are in, and/or who have been developed by our NSE to lead the way. 
 
However, are they prepared for what we ask of them? As former U.S. Coast 
Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen and others (including myself) have 
argued, almost everything of any consequence that government does today is 
collaboratively co-produced by a complex collection of public and private 
entities, from other agencies and levels of government, to nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and even other countries, and international bodies.1 
This is becoming the “new normal” for national leaders—whether they are 
elected, or in the case of senior career military and civilian officials, appointed 
or selected—and it has made their job exponentially more difficult. From the 
short-term dramas of pandemics, hurricanes, ecological disasters, and “lone 
wolf” terrorist attacks to the decades-long challenges of homeland security, 
energy independence, the health of our veterans and, at the extreme, great 
power competition and conflict—virtually everything government does 
requires the concerted efforts of complex networks that are comprised of 
multiple actors and organizations. 
 
In this regard, there is a realization among senior government leaders, both 
military and civilian, that the national security challenges they face can no 
longer be addressed by individual agencies or commands, each narrowly 
                                                          
1 Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service: Ensuring Leadership Excellence in 
our Federal Government, ed. Ronald Sanders (National Academy of Public 
Administration, 2017). See also Tackling Wicked Government Problems: A Practical 
guide for Enterprise Leader, Nickerson and Sanders, ed., (Brookings Institution Press, 
second edition 2014). 
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(even myopically) focused on its own specialized authorities and 
responsibilities. Rather, as those challenges become even more complex and 
interdependent, leaders at all levels—all with potentially overlapping 
jurisdictions and diverse areas of expertise—are required to collaborate with 
one another towards some common mission outcome. Thus, NSE leaders 
must have the meta-leadership skills to reach beyond their immediate 
organizations and mobilize a network of interdependent actors to achieve a 
shared mission and in so doing, achieve outcomes that are greater than the 
sum of their individual parts.2 
 
A New Kind of NSE 
For purposes of this paper, NSE is defined in two ways. First, in concept, it 
represents all of the various departments and agencies, mostly though not 
exclusively federal, that have some responsibility for the U.S. national and 
homeland security missions broadly defined. This includes the “usual 
suspects” like the Defense Department (DOD) and the elements of the 
Intelligence Community (IC), but it also includes parts of the Departments of 
Energy, State, Justice, and Commerce, as well as more specialized agencies 
and departmental subcomponents like the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and 
the National Oceanic and Administrative Administration.  
 
Not every element of that constellation of organizations will be relevant to a 
particular circumstance—indeed, that is part of the leadership challenge—so 
the second definition is more situational. In that context, the NSE is that 
operational subset of those institutional entities that may be necessary to 
accomplish a specific national or international mission sanctioned by the 
United States as relevant to its national security. These situationally relevant 
constellations can include federal, state, and local government departments 
and agencies, their subordinate bureaus and divisions, and even tribal 
governments. But they can also encompass the private sector and not-for-
profit NGOs, the United Nations, the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
even organizations like the International Red Cross, Doctors Without 
Borders, and their regional counterparts and analogs. 
                                                          
2 Adapted from Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service, Sanders, ed., (National 
Academy of Public Administration, 2017). See also See Tackling Wicked Government 
Problem. See also Marcus, L., et all, “Crisis preparedness and Crisis Response: The meta-
Leadership Model and Method,” in D. Kamien, ed., McGraw-Hill Homeland Security 
Handbook. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012). 
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And a New Kind of National Security Leader 
Whatever the combination, our national leaders increasingly look to someone 
in or from the NSE to lead them, even when the national security implications 
may not seem so apparent. The challenge may be strategic and long-term, to 
address global issues such as migration, drought, and climate change (yes, 
that too has been defined as a national security issue), or regional ones such 
as the Syrian civil war and its attendant refugee crisis, North Korea’s 
bellicosity, or the fragile European Union. Or it may be more operational, 
such as border security, counterterrorism, or emergency management during 
a disaster.  
 
While the composition and purpose of the constellation may vary—indeed, it 
almost certainly will—there is one common denominator: the mission at hand 
involves multiple actors and organizations, each semi-autonomous or 
independent, yet bound together to achieve a common task. And it needs 
someone to lead them. Take the Ebola crisis of just a few years ago. When it 
suddenly metastasized—from something tragic but far from our shores to an 
issue that has all sorts of intertwined international and domestic implications 
ranging from disease control protocols to border security—the challenges 
were enormous. Yet who did the White House (and the world) look to for 
leadership in that regard? Civilian and military leaders drawn mostly from the 
NSE to coordinate the various elements of this complex enterprise.3  
 
In other words, these whole-of-government and whole-of-nation challenges 
are extra-organizational in nature (a characteristic that has significant 
implications for the development of enterprise leaders), and they require a 
leader who can achieve unity of effort—among multiple entities, each with its 
own agenda, interests, culture, and politics—without the luxury of unity of 
command. To do so requires a whole new set of leadership competencies that, 
with some exception, have not been deliberately or formally developed by the 
NSE.  
 
What Makes for an Effective NSE Leader? 
It is clear that the effective NSE leader needs to have a deep understanding of 
the institutional, organizational, and (especially) the individual actors that 
comprise the enterprise, and that does not mean just an understanding of 
                                                          
3 As well as a special military-like “czar" (Ron McCain, who demonstrated many of the 
qualities of a NSE leader) appointed by—and reporting directly to—to the President, with 
the implicit power of that office.   
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their missions and structures and budgets and bureaucratic processes. 
Although those are important, the enterprise leader must also understand 
their mindsets—a product of their histories and cultures, their traditions and 
stories, even their heroes and lore—if he or she is going to be successful. The 
NSE leader must also acquire the empathy to see their shared challenge from 
a collective, inter-subjective point of view, rather than a strictly parochial one. 
 
Second, the NSE leader must be able to connect the dots across that 
enterprise; that is, to be able to see and understand the NSE as a dynamic, 
interconnected social system, with complex formal and informal inter-
relationships and inter-dependencies, positive and negative feedback loops, 
etc. that exist between and among the enterprise’s constituent organizations. 
The leader must also understand how the relevant parts of the NSE interact 
with those other elements of the enterprise that may act in opposition to its 
interest and objectives. Finally, since those organizations are populated—and 
more importantly, led—by people, the NSE leader must also be able to grasp 
the complex social networks that exist within and among those counterparts 
(formal and otherwise) who can influence action, build new relational 
networks, and most importantly, leverage them to achieve the aim of the 
enterprise. 
 
Finally, the enterprise leader needs to be able to lead without formal 
authority, well- beyond his or her official chain of command. This quality 
distinguishes the NSE leader from his or her more internally-focused 
colleagues, for while they too must be able to exercise influence over peers 
and colleagues of equal stature and rank, they do so in the context of a shared 
chain of command that ultimately leads to the head of the component, agency 
or department—where the buck stops. In most cases, the NSE leader enjoys 
no such luxury. Thus, while in theory, all such leaders and their organizations 
report to the President, there is no such practical reality, and without effective 
enterprise leadership, interagency impasses often fester, or worse, become 
muddled and mired in the search for the lowest common denominator 
consensus.  
 
In today’s NSE, inter-dependence (or inter-reliance) is the rule, rather than 
the exception. Senior officials or commanders in one or more of its 
constituent organizations will rarely have any sort of formal, chain of 
command authority over the entire network of extra-organizational 
components that are critical to the success of the enterprise; however, those 
senior officials may still be held personally accountable for that success. 
Today this is an all-too-common contradiction to the classic axiom that 
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authority must match accountability. To be successful, the NSE leader 
requires certain boundary-spanning, net-centric competencies and 
characteristics that are fundamentally different from those implicitly intra-
organizational competencies necessary to lead any one of the enterprise’s 
organizational components.  
 
To be sure, this unity of effort can be achieved on a transactional basis. Two 
or more organizations can achieve common ends simply by barter and 
exchange of information, resources, people, even promises (i.e. “if you do this 
for me, I will do this for you”). However, that transactional approach can be 
fragile and often results in a “whole” that is less than the sum of its parts. A 
NSE built on transactions may not be resilient enough for the challenges it 
must confront, and while some transactions are inevitable, a necessary 
precondition to enterprise, they are not likely to be resilient enough to 
weather the mission turbulence that is also inevitable. To be up to its wicked 
task, an enterprise must be built on a shared sense of mission, shared values 
and interests, shared experiences, and trust. And it takes a special kind of 
leader to be able to create and leverage those conditions across an enterprise. 
 
This kind of challenge is largely immune to the hard power of chain of 
command authority. Instead, it requires collaborative, integrated, soft power 
leadership to mobilize and unify the complex network of co-producers who 
share any given mission space. This has significant implications for leadership 
development. While these competencies are now required (and expected) of 
senior NSE leaders, they are not specifically developed in them. This needs to 
change.  
 
Developing NSE Leaders: A Brief History 
While it may not use precisely these terms, certain parts of the NSE 
recognized the nascent need for this kind of integrated, boundary-spanning 
leadership, at least in the military domain. More than 30 years ago, a few 
visionaries realized (after some painful lessons on a small island named 
Grenada) that to effectively fight—and more importantly, win—modern wars, 
our armed forces needed to operate in a far more integrated way. In response, 
they made jointness part of our commissioned officer corps’ genetic code, the 
result of the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986.4  
 
                                                          
4 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
433 (1986). 
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And as a practical matter, that integration was codified by the more 
mechanical but no less effective mandate that a military officer must complete 
at least one joint duty assignment as a prerequisite to promotion to flag rank. 
That requirement forced the development of military leaders who, at least in 
theory, could focus on the entire domain of hard power combat arms. Many 
attribute the phenomenal success of the U.S. armed forces during and since 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm to its unifying effects. However, as farsighted as 
the NSE was in that regard, even it never anticipated—nor prepared its 
leaders for—the challenges of the Ebola plague, nation-building, or 
countering violent Islamic extremism.  
 
Nevertheless, while the notion of jointness represented a great leap forward in 
leadership, the painful lessons that led to it had to be relearned by the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (IC) on September 11, 2001. The tragic events that 
transpired are all too familiar, and they need not be recounted here; however, 
it is useful to consider the reasons for the apparent failure of the federal 
government’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent 
the attacks.  
 
In that regard, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that among other 
things, the IC lacked senior leaders who had the wherewithal to lead the 
entire U.S. Intelligence Community, and in so doing, know, understand, and 
most importantly, integrate all of the IC’s collection, analytic, and kinetic 
capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat as it evolved. The more-or-less 
contemporaneous Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (otherwise 
known as the WMD Commission), reached a similar conclusion concerning 
that particular intelligence failure: just as with 9/11, the IC lacked—and 
desperately needed—senior leaders who had an enterprise-wide perspective.  
 
Those conclusions—as well as the lessons that precipitated Goldwater–
Nichols—were not lost on the subsequent drafters of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and they mandated a similar 
approach in the IC. Specifically, the IRTPA required that the newly created 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) “seek to duplicate joint [military] 
officer management policies established by…the Goldwater–Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” More specifically, it 
authorized the DNI to “prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of 
[civilian] personnel of the intelligence community through various elements 
of the intelligence community in the course of their careers” and to make such 
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interagency assignments “a condition of promotion to such positions within 
the intelligence community as the Director shall specify,” all in an effort to 
mirror the military requirement established by Goldwater–Nichols.5  
 
With those statutory mandates in-hand, the Office of the DNI (ODNI) 
established a civilian equivalent of the military’s joint duty policy, requiring 
IC professionals to complete at least one extended interagency assignment as 
a mandatory prerequisite for promotion to senior executive rank—the civilian 
equivalent of a general officer in the military. 6 This requirement applied to 
each of the autonomous senior services that covered civilian leaders within 
the IC, including the “regular” Senior Executive Service (SES), as well as the 
DOD and FBI SES corp(s), and the CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service.7   
 
For those that completed such a civilian joint duty assignment (or JDA, as it 
came to be known) and became eligible to compete for such promotions, 
ODNI also identified and validated a set of competencies that were intended 
to describe the qualities of someone capable of “Leading the Intelligence 
Enterprise,” which collectively served as the basis for rating and ranking 
candidates for such promotions.8 Those requirements remain in effect to this 
day, and they have produced a senior leadership cadre in the IC that is close 
to 100 percent “joint” in nature.  
 
However, the IC was not the only part of the Federal government to recognize 
this emerging leadership requirement. At about the same time, then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Gordon England established a similar set of 
requirements for the estimated 1,300 senior civilian career executives within 
DOD. Because it lacked a legislative mandate comparable to the Goldwater–
Nichols Act or the IC’s Intelligence Reform Act, the Department chose not to 
establish interagency mobility (and the leadership competencies associated 
with it) as a mandatory prerequisite for entry into those senior executive 
ranks; however, DOD officials did make a mobility assignment after an 
individual’s initial SES selection a mandatory prerequisite for promotion to 
                                                          
5 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (2004). 
6 In the interest of full disclosure, this author led that effort for the DNI. As noted, the IC 
has far more senior civilian positions than DOD does flag officers and career executives. 
7 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community Directive 
No. 660, Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program (2013), available at: 
https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-660.pdf.  
8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community Directive 
No. 610, Competency Directories for the Intelligence Community Workforce (2010), 
available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_610.pdf.  
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higher-than-entry-level SES rank. 9 Unfortunately, for various reasons, the 
strict enforcement of those requirements has been uneven, and the 
Department’s civilian executive corps reflects that fact. 
 
Other parts of the Federal government’s NSE also saw the need for these 
enterprise leadership competencies during and immediately after Hurricane 
Katrina, when unconnected federal, state, and local relief efforts made a 
horrendous natural disaster even worse. However, there was a silver lining of 
sorts. The Homeland Security Council’s after-action review of the disaster led 
to the issuance of Executive Order 13434, National Security Professional 
Development (NSPD), by President George W. Bush, which established its 
namesake program.10 Taking a page from similar efforts (and antecedents!) in 
DOD and the IC, the NSPD program was specifically designed to develop the 
very same enterprise leadership competencies across the agencies that made 
up the U.S. National Security establishment. In so doing, it sought to produce 
enterprise leaders who could successfully lead a whole-of-government/whole-
of-nation response to the next Katrina.11  
 
Unfortunately, that well-intentioned vision was never fully realized in the 
Bush Administration, and for years thereafter, the NSPD program atrophied 
from benign neglect. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management made a 
laudable but belated attempt to reinvigorate the program in July of 2016, 
issuing guidance that encouraged agencies to identify those senior civilian 
positions in the NSE that require interagency experience as a technical 
qualification requirement (although not necessarily a leadership one); and it 
urged the use of temporary and permanent career-broadening assignments, 
as well as existing inter-agency rotation programs like the one sponsored by 
the President’s Management Council, to develop candidates who could meet 
that requirement. It also commended agencies to afford those candidates who 
had actually acquired such interagency leadership experience “strong 
preference” when making selections for those executive positions.12 However, 
                                                          
9 Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. See also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004. See also U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1400.25, Vol. 1403 
(1996), DOD Civilian Personnel Management System. 
10 Exec. Order No. 13434, National security professional development, May 17, 2007, 
available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2007-05-21/pdf/WCPD-2007-05-
21-Pg650.pdf.  
11 Ibid.  
12 National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Interagency Personnel Rotations 
Program Guidance [OPM letter, June 2016], available at: 
https://www.chcoc.gov/content/national-security-professional-development-nspd-
interagency-personnel-rotations-program-0. In its most recent NSPD guidance, OPM 
recommends the PMC program and encourages agencies to give those who complete its 
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as is evident, this guidance was largely hortatory and its impact accordingly 
negligible.  
 
Developing the “New” National Security Leader 
The goal of Executive Order 13434—that is, the establishment of a 
professional development program for the entire NSE—remains as valid today 
as it was when it was first issued more than a decade ago, perhaps even more 
so. That Enterprise has an emergent but no less urgent need for a cadre of 
senior leaders, both military and civilian, who understand all of its 
complexities and interconnectedness, and more importantly, who have the 
competencies to be able to lead effectively across the entire national security 
mission space.  
 
However, as important as that cadre may be to the effective operation of the 
NSE overall, the actual development and deployment of its individual leaders 
remains the internal—and largely unconnected—responsibility of its 
individual departments and agencies (and in the case of DOD, its individual 
components). For the most part, those individual agencies make the day-to-
day decisions so crucial to leader development—who to develop, promote, 
reward, assign—and this means that the senior leaders they produce reflect 
their individual, agency-centric missions and cultures. The net result: senior 
leaders, even those in uniform, who find it increasingly difficult to deal with 
the sorts of whole-of-government and whole-of-nation challenges that they 
are asked to lead.  
 
Moreover, those individual agency-level leadership development efforts have 
been uneven at best. For example, while the U.S. military sets the gold 
standard for uniformed leader development, particularly of the joint kind, its 
civilian leadership development efforts lag far behind. Yet even those efforts 
surpass most other civilian national security agencies, which under-invest in 
leadership development of even the most basic kind, especially when 
compared to DOD overall. And as one would expect, the situation is even 
worse at the enterprise level. Only the 17 elements of the IC—a relatively small 
fraction of the total NSE—operate under a common, interdepartmental leader 
development framework established by the DNI.  
 
Thus, in my view, the NSE urgently needs to develop and execute an 
enterprise-wide executive-level talent management strategy that is designed 
                                                          
required 6-month rotational assignment “strong preference” in SES positions that require 
a whole-of-government perspective.  
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to deliberately develop and deploy its senior military and civilian leaders 
across its entire potential mission space. And that strategy must include (1) 
some sort of multi-agency governance structure to devise it, and then to 
manage its day-to-day execution; (2) the identification and validation of the 
leadership competencies that are critical to leadership success at the 
enterprise level; (3) a curriculum of formal enterprise leadership education, 
perhaps including the NSE equivalent of the National Defense University; and 
lastly (4) policies and processes to require and manage mobility across the 
entire spectrum of the enterprise, as the most effective way to acquire and 
demonstrate those competencies.  
 
Competencies as the DNA of Enterprise Leadership 
These days, the science of leadership and leader development typically starts 
with competencies…the knowledges, skills, abilities, and attributes that taken 
together, make for an effective leader. In effect, those competencies represent 
the DNA of an organization’s leadership, and to stretch the human genome 
analogy a bit, there are almost as many leadership competency models in the 
literature (and in practice) as there are combinations of chromosomes. That 
said, the competencies required of senior leaders in the NSE are emergent, 
and with some exception, they are not likely part of most traditional (that is, 
existing) leadership competency models, except perhaps by accident.  
 
In that regard, we must acknowledge the inherent limitations of those 
traditional leadership competency models. The vast majority—especially 
those preached and practiced in our own NSE—implicitly assume that senior 
leaders enjoy authority commensurate with their accountability, clear unity of 
command, and the hard power of positional authority; indeed, even though 
those models may advocate a kinder, gentler application of that hard power, 
the superior-subordinate relationships that underlie it remain, albeit 
unspoken. Thus, when the leader speaks, gently or otherwise, his or her 
subordinates are expected to obey. However, while NSE leaders will regularly 
face challenges that are largely immune to the hard power of chain-of-
command authority, the leadership competencies necessary to do so have yet 
to be identified for the NSE writ large.  
 
The IC and DOD offer a good start in that regard, having done so for their 
respective senior civilians—and their respective parts of the larger enterprise. 
Their competency models suggest that among other things, NSE leaders must 
be able to (1) understand the institutional, organizational, and individual 
actors that comprise that mission space, to include their cultural mindsets 
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and even their bureaucratic dialects; (2) conceptualize those actors as a single 
dynamic social system, with complex formal and informal interrelationships 
and inter-dependencies; (3) identify the patterns and networks of influence 
between and among those individual actors and organizations; and (4) build 
and leverage those networks to achieve the collective objectives of the 
enterprise.   
 
But that is only a start. If the NSE is to begin to develop a cadre of senior 
officers, both military and civilian, capable of leading that enterprise, the first 
order of business should be to identify and validate (in the technical sense of 
the word) the competencies required to do so.13  
 
Mobility to Develop and Demonstrate Enterprise Leadership 
Competencies 
Assuming the NSE can identify and validate the competencies necessary to 
lead it, how does it—and its constituent organizations—go about developing 
leaders who can demonstrate them? Given the likely nature of these 
competencies, enterprise-wide mobility may be the single most effective way 
of doing so, but this prospect is far easier said than done.  
 
The good news: mobility is something embedded in the career development 
paradigm (indeed, the very culture) of our armed forces, at least since the end 
of World War II. And as previously noted, the U.S. military’s operational 
definition of that term was significantly broadened in 1986 by the 
requirement in the Goldwater–Nichols Act for one or more joint assignments 
as an essential part of an officer’s career path. The not so good news? Those 
joint assignments are still largely confined to other military components in 
the DOD and do not begin to prepare the most senior military officers for the 
challenges associated with the even broader NSE.  
 
                                                          
13 According to the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (at chapter 29 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, §1607), an organization must demonstrate an 
empirical relationship between the requirement for a particular competency and actual 
success on the job. Many of the leadership competencies proffered by existing models 
have not been validated in that technical sense of that word, in part because validation 
can be a difficult and time-consuming process; however, it is legally necessary if those 
competencies are to be used to make personnel decisions, like who gets selected or 
promoted to key leadership positions. Note that for the most part, the military is exempt 
from the Uniform Guidelines. Of course, that begs the “who is in charge question,” but 
even without its answer, it may be possible the members of the NSE to come to some 
agreement on a set of essential leadership competencies. 
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However, it is even more problematic on the civilian side of the enterprise. In 
theory, all of the various senior civilian services encompassed by that NSE 
(like the Senior Executive Service) assume mobility as a condition of 
promotion into executive ranks; however, what post–promotion mobility 
there is tends to be insular, that is, within the senior executive’s “parent” 
department or agency. Thus, while Senior Foreign Service officers are globally 
mobile, their mobility is almost exclusively within the confines of the State 
Department. Similarly, while senior civilian executives within DOD’s military 
departments have become more mobile of late, that mobility is almost 
exclusively within their home service.  
 
More importantly for our purposes, unlike the military, civilian mobility 
requirements generally attend only after promotion to senior rank, rather 
than as a prerequisite thereto. In other words, it is generally not required as 
part of civilian leader development. There are some exceptions: for the most 
part, the military departments expect some degree of mobility as a 
precondition to a civilian’s promotion to senior executive rank; however, it is 
not mandatory, and when it does occur, it is almost exclusively within the 
civilian’s “home” service. Only in the IC is interagency mobility a mandatory 
prerequisite for promotion to senior rank, and it is specifically intended to 
ensure that senior promotion candidates are prepared to lead the entire IC, 
and not just a single agency.  
 
Thus, it is clear that if the NSE wants senior military and civilian leaders with 
the competencies to lead it, it must do two things. First, for military officers, it 
must broaden the concept of joint duty—especially as a precursor to flag 
rank—to include assignments beyond the Combatant Commands, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff, to other departments and 
agencies, multi and international organizations like NATO and the UN, and 
even the private sector, via vehicles like the Secretary of Defense’s Corporate 
Fellows Program. To be sure, many of those assignments occur today, and 
officers receive some joint service credit for completing them, but they are 
treated as “consolation prizes” for those not selected for a coveted tour of duty 
to a Combatant Command, the Joint Staff, or a senior service school. 
 
For civilians, the answer is even more straightforward: Mobility should be a 
mandatory qualification requirement for senior rank, just like it is for civilian 
professionals in the IC. That is, before an NSE civilian is even considered for 
promotion to flag-equivalent rank. And like their military analogs, civilian 
mobility assignments should not be limited to their home agency. If the 
objective is to prepare civilians to share the burden of leading the NSE, their 
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professional development must include assignments across that enterprise. 
This should sound familiar, as it is exactly what Executive Order 13434 had in 
mind when it established the now largely moribund NSPD program.  
 
One can argue that pre–promotion (developmental) mobility need not be a 
necessary prerequisite for all senior national security civilians, especially at 
the entry executive level. After all, there will always be a need for highly 
specialized technical or functional civilian executives in the NSE, as well as 
those who are intimately familiar with a particular agency’s mission. 
However, I would contend that even the NSE’s more mundane internal 
challenges—administrative, technical, managerial, etc.—would benefit from 
leaders who have had these cross-cutting experiences.  
 
Toward a Senior Leader Talent Management Strategy  
It should be apparent by now that the 21st century national security 
environment demands senior NSE leaders who are able to see the big picture, 
take a whole-of-government point of view, employ certain enterprise 
leadership competencies to overcome agency-centric stovepipes, and have the 
resilience to achieve interagency, intergovernmental, and/or international 
unity of effort regardless of the challenge. And thoughtfully planned, 
increasingly responsible developmental mobility assignments, starting well 
before an individual becomes a senior officer or official, may be the most 
effective way to develop those competencies.14  
 
All mobility assignments, developmental and otherwise, must be managed at 
the enterprise-level as part of an integrated talent management strategy, but 
today, no such corporate mechanism exists to do so. The problem is that as a 
practical matter, no one official actually leads the NSE, so developing and 
executing such a senior leader development strategy itself becomes an 
exercise in collaborative soft power, perhaps led by the President’s National 
Security Advisor or a specially designated subset of the National Security 
Council’s Principals Committee.  
 
The spotty history of Executive Order 13434 is instructive in this regard. 
President Bush initially vested responsibility for implementing his Order with 
the Office of Personnel Management, but after several months of relative 
inaction—and the personal intervention of the Deputy Director for 
Management within the Office of Management and Budget—that 
                                                          
14 Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service.  
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responsibility was transferred to OMB. Thereafter, that same Deputy Director 
took it upon himself to bring a sense of urgency to the initiative (after all, who 
knew when the next Katrina would hit?) and significant progress was made 
during the last two years of the Bush Administration. As the Obama 
Administration took office, those involved in the program were optimistic that 
this momentum could be sustained, but despite some early hopeful signs—
President Obama’s newly-appointed National Security Advisor was among a 
group of current and former national security thought leaders who had 
endorsed the concept as part of a report on modernizing the Goldwater–
Nichols Act—that optimism turned out to be short-lived, and implementation 
has remained stagnant for much of the past eight years.  
 
So, when it comes to the development and execution of a senior officer talent 
management strategy for the NSE, “who will be in charge?” remains the most 
vexing question. However, when it comes to the strategy itself, successful 
examples exist. For example, DOD comes close, with senior military 
assignments (including joint ones) centrally managed by the individual 
services and the Joint Staff under broad Department-wide policy guidelines. 
As noted, DOD has also established similar policy guidelines for the 
development and deployment of its civilian executives, as well as a governing 
body—the Defense Executive Advisory Board (DEAB)—to manage them. 
Established by a DOD Directive and nominally chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary, the DEAB conducts regular executive talent reviews, 
recommending decisions about selection, development, and deployment 
across the agency; however, DOD tends to focus more on its top career 
civilians (tiers two and three of its three-tiered structure) in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the “fourth estate” of defense agencies, leaving the 
military services to manage their own civilian executive cadres under the aegis 
of the Department’s overarching policy directive. 15 
 
The IC takes a similar federated approach, with each of the six cabinet 
departments and two executive agencies (ODNI and CIA) retaining 
“ownership” over their respective senior civilian executives—together, they 
total more than all of DOD—and managing them accordingly. Moreover, the 
larger intelligence subcomponents of those departments—like the National 
Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the FBI—also have separate approaches to talent 
                                                          
15 U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1400.25, Vol. 1403 (1996), DOD Civilian 
Personnel Management System. 
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management.16 Thus, while the coordination of senior executive development 
and deployment does occur in this federated system, it is far less formal than 
DOD’s military and civilian mechanisms.17 
 
Most importantly, DOD and the IC have demonstrated that senior civilian 
leader development (to include developmental mobility assignments) can be 
managed across cabinet departments, military services, and executive 
agencies without asking the heads of those individual departments and 
agencies to give up legal “ownership” of their senior leaders. The IC’s version 
of this federated model—in which its component departments voluntarily 
subscribe to common, multi-departmental leader development framework—
offers a way ahead in that regard.18 But to say that even this federated 
approach threatens all sorts of bureaucratic rice bowls (each agency tends to 
view its senior officers and executives for its “internal use only”) is an 
understatement, and the resistance to such a notion will be considerable. Yet 
it must be overcome if the nation wants senior military and civilian leaders 
who are able to effectively lead the NSE. 
                                                          
16 Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence 
Community Model (Thompson, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2010), 
available at: http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/federated-human-
resource-management-federal-government-intelligence-community-model.  
17 It is interesting to note that DOD’s civilian intelligence executives are not included in 
the DEAB’s talent review.  
18 Ibid. 
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